Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed

Duncan Pritchard in TPM Online reviews Truth: A Guide For The Perplexed by Simon Blackburn

For example, part of the motivation for relativist thinking comes from some rather poorly thought-out sceptical considerations which, oddly, are then taken to support relativistic rather than sceptical conclusions. The mere possibility of error, for instance, is taken by some (see Lynch [True to Life: Why Truth Matters] for numerous examples) to be a decisive ground to regard all claims as suspect. This is clearly a non sequitur, but even if one does move to the conclusion of this inference on this basis alone, it is hard to see why this conclusion should support relativism rather than plain old-fashioned scepticism. Surely, if any moral is to be drawn from this reasoning, it is that we are unable to know anything of substance, not that everyone's "knowledge" -- even when that "knowledge" is conflicting -- is all equally bona fide.